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Abstract 
 
Most heterodox theories of the business enterprise base themselves on the Veblenian going 
concern in which managers pursue the long-run survival and growth of the enterprise, whereas 
absentee owners are occupied with short-run financial interests. Since Veblen’s era, the capitalist 
social provisioning process has evolved toward money manager capitalism in a dialectical 
fashion. At the heart of the transformation are changes in the business enterprise. In this paper, 
we make a threefold argument. First, while the Veblenian account of a going concern still holds 
true for many enterprises, more and more of the economy is being directed toward financial 
concerns. Second, as a consequence, the social provisioning process becomes more unstable and 
people’s welfare becomes more vulnerable. Third, the concept of a going concern is therefore to 
be modified in order to put the business enterprise in the context of money manager capitalism. 
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1. Introduction 
 
That the modern business enterprise is a going concern, first theorized by Thorstein Veblen, has 
been widely received by heterodox economists. The evolution of capitalism in recent decades 
characterized by the dominance of capital markets and the financialization of the corporation 
questions the Veblenian position on the business enterprise. Is the business enterprise in effect 
concerned about its survival and growth? Is Veblen’s theory of the business enterprise formed in 
the early 20th century still relevant? Or does his theory still have potential, once it is updated in 
accordance with the changing capitalist modus operandi, for adding new insights to the 
understanding of the business enterprise in our time?   
We argue that Veblen’s going concern concept is still important in the account of an 
economy as a continuing process of social provisioning since a viable economy requires 
continuing business over historical time. The behavior of the business enterprise in recent times 
is, however, in contradiction to the “going” enterprise as well as the “continuing” economy. In 
particular, financially oriented business behavior makes the social provisioning process more 
unstable and renders people’s welfare more vulnerable. This point was also anticipated by 
Veblen’s evolutionary analysis of economy. We hence argue that the meaning of a going concern 
is to be updated with regard to the present business culture and institutions that drive the actions 
of managers and owners of the business enterprise. 
 In Section 2, Veblen’s theory of the business enterprise is revisited in terms of the issues 
relevant to our questions in this paper. That is: 1) the separation of ownership and control; 2) the 
conflict of interest between the business enterprise and the community; 3) the control of the 
business enterprise by captains of industry and of finance; and 4) the nature of corporate 
finance—that is, capitalization of earning capacity. We then, in Section 3, move on to the going 
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concern concept in close relation to the social provisioning process. Here we argue that the 
distinction between what a going concern means and how it actually behaves should be 
established, and that Veblen’s theory offers a theoretical foundation for the business enterprise in 
the ever-changing historical process of capitalism. In Section 4, we discuss the evolution of 
capitalism with a focus on the financialization of the business enterprise from the Veblen-cum-
Minsky’s perspective as well as from the social network perspective. Minsky’s vision of money 
manager capitalism is reinforced by the updated Veblenian analysis of the business enterprise, 
and Veblen’s position is in turn reinforced by Minsky’s analysis. The final section concludes the 
paper.  
 
2. The Place of the Business Enterprise in Veblen’s Analysis of Credit Economy 
 
In his 1904 The Theory of Business Enterprise, Thorstein Veblen advanced a theory of the then-
modern corporation that fundamentally deviated from the conventional “theory of the firm.” 
Rather than resting on a hypothetical mode of organization associated with the “handicraft” 
(small-scale) stage of capitalism, Veblen’s analysis developed the argument within the stage of 
the “credit economy” in which the capital market dominates the goods market. Rather than 
production in order to “earn a livelihood,” the point of the modern business enterprise is to make 
“profits on investment.” His theory was influenced by his direct observation of the Great Merger 
Movement in the period from 1897 to 1904 and of the remarkable growth of Wall Street and 
absentee owners.  
For our purposes, among other aspects of Veblen’s analysis, several features stand out. 
Initially, there is a separation of management and ownership. Rather than the typical owner-
4 
 
manager associated with the handicraft stage, one now finds absentee owners who hire 
professional managers to oversee the production operations of the enterprise. Managers pursue 
the long-run survival and growth of the enterprise, while owners are largely concerned with 
short-run financial interests. In this,  
 
the holdings of industrial property that count…toward control of the business 
situation, the intangible assets (represented by common stock, good-will, and the 
like) are chiefly of consequence. Hence…the fortunes of property owners are in 
large measure dependent on the discretion of others—the owners of intangible 
property; and the management of the industrial equipment tends strongly to centre 
in the hands of men who do not own the industrial equipment, and who have only 
a remote interest in the efficient working of this equipment…. [T]he material 
processes of industry are under the control of men whose interest centres on an 
increased value of the immaterial assets. (Veblen [1904] 1975, 175-76).  
 
Thus, “[t]he motive of business is pecuniary gain…. The aim and usual outcome is an 
accumulation of wealth” (Ibid., 20). To our understanding, Veblen’s observation implies that 
although the separation of ownership and control mirrors the changes in social classes (and in the 
structure of the business corporation), the interests of owners and managers tend to coincide 
under the regime of the credit economy. In other words, Veblen anticipated the dominance of 
Wall Street because of the very nature of the modern business corporation. Moreover, the 
distinction between a captain of industry and a captain of finance is not very important for 
Veblen to the extent that their interests are directed by the prevailing culture and institutions of 
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the time. A captain of industry, like J.P. Morgan, can also be a captain of finance, or one 
“mutates” into another. A captain’s primary interest lies in the making of “pecuniary gain” by 
means of (or the disruption of) productive activities or financial capitalization. The 
“Entrepreneur,” noted Veblen, “takes care of the financial end of things…. The typical 
entrepreneur is the corporation financier…. Indeed, it is nearly true that in current usage 
“producer” has come to mean “financial manager”” (Veblen 1921, 29, original emphasis). “The 
captain of industry, typified by the corporation financier, and latterly by the investment banker,” 
continues Veblen, “is one of the institutions that go to make up the new order of things, which 
has been coming on among all the civilized peoples ever since the Industrial Revolution set in” 
(Veblen 1921, 31). The transition from industrial capitalism to financial capitalism (or ownership 
society) is thus best delineated by “a redistribution of the ownership of property” (Veblen [1904] 
1975, 114) from the debtor class to the creditor class. 
Secondly, there arises a conflict of interest between the business enterprise and the 
community. “The outcome of this management of industrial affairs through pecuniary 
transactions…has been to dissociate the interests of those men who exercise the discretion from 
the interests of the community” (Veblen [1904] 1975, 29). That is, the welfare of the community, 
associated with the social provisioning process, is directly related to the production of output—
the industrial process, while the interests of the “Captains of Industry” (or “Finance”) is purely of 
a pecuniary nature. And these interests might well, and probably will, diverge. While the 
industrial system could potentially function as something of an integrated, harmonious machine, 
the modern businessman is interested in “the interstitial adjustments of the industrial system” in 
which “[h]is gains (or losses) are related to the magnitude of the disturbances that take place, 
rather than to their bearing upon the welfare of the community” (Ibid., 28-9). Essentially, the 
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money-making and output-making aspects of the modern capitalist economy are (usually) at 
odds. “Serviceability…is not the decisive point. The decisive point is business expediency and 
business pressure” (Ibid., 39).  As Dudley Dillard once put it, “[r]eal goods appear to the 
individual producer as an artificial form of wealth until they are converted into money which 
appears as real wealth to the individual producer” (Dillard 1954, 28-9). In particular, “sabotage” 
of production, thus increasing monetary gain, is standard business practice when sufficient 
control of an industry has been established, and this obviously runs counter to the objectives of 
the community which is interested in increasing that production.  It is important to note that the 
corporate mode of control has certain monetary as well as industrial advantages. By eliminating 
smaller, rival concerns, there are reductions in business expenses as well as increases in 
standardization and (potential) industrial efficiency. “[P]robably the largest…service rendered by 
the great modern captains of industry is this curtailment of the business to be done,—this 
sweeping retirement of business men as a class from the service and the definitive cancelment of 
opportunities for private enterprise” (Veblen [1904] 1975, 48). Further, through integration, in 
particular vertical integration, the various component elements of a production process are 
collectivized (or “rationalized”), leading to greater industrial efficiency. 
Third, corporate control may be of a permanent or temporary nature. If the “captain” 
gains sufficient control of a large portion of industry, it is more likely that this control would be 
of a “permanent” nature, and “it may be to his interest to make and maintain business conditions 
which shall facilitate the smooth and efficient working of what has come under his control…. 
But also in a large proportion of these transactions the business men’s endeavors are directed to a 
temporary control of the properties in order to close out at an advance or to gain some indirect 
advantage; that is to say, the transactions have a strategic purpose…. His interest in the particular 
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block of industrial equipment is, then, altogether transient….” (Ibid., 30-31). It is fairly clear that 
Veblen’s understanding of permanent versus temporary control was informed by the first great 
merger movement.  
The last characteristic of concern here speaks to the modern economy as a “credit 
economy.”  Contrasting then-modern capitalism with the “money economy” associated with the 
handicraft stage, Veblen highlights several features that are important for our purposes. With the 
development of the corporation, “the basis of capitalization has gradually shifted, until the basis 
is now no longer given by the cost of material equipment owned, but the earning-capacity of the 
corporation as a going concern” (Ibid., 137). “The effective [business] capitalization…is not 
fixed permanently and inflexibly by a past act of incorporation or stock issue. It is fixed for the 
time being only, by an ever recurring valuation of the company’s properties, tangible and 
intangible, on the basis of their earning-capacity. In this capitalization of earning-capacity the 
nucleus of the capitalization is not the cost of the plant, but the concern’s good-will….” (Ibid., 
138). Good-will includes various sorts of factors—trade-marks, copyrights and patents, brand 
names, reputation—“that give a differential advantage to their owners, but they are of no 
aggregate advantage to the community….they make no part of the wealth of nations” (Ibid., 139-
140).  
In the credit economy, the capital market dominates the goods market. This opens the 
door to an ongoing “valuation and revaluation—i.e. a capitalization and recapitalization—on the 
basis of its [the corporation’s] presumptive earning-capacity, whereby it all assumes more of less 
of a character of intangibility” (Ibid., 154). In this process, the most important consideration is 
that of good-will, “since these are intangible goods from start to finish” (Ibid.) 
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In this ongoing valuation and revaluation, one finds a more or less constant 
reorganization of the corporation. Credit enters this process at two points: in the financing of the 
reorganization and in the inflation of stock prices. The former advantages the organizer and the 
providers of credit; the latter, the stockholders (Ibid., 120, ff.)  Further, the “putative earning-
capacity of a given block of capital…may differ appreciably from the actual earning-capacity of 
the capital as known to its manager; and it may readily be to the latter’s interest that such a 
discrepancy between actual and impute earning-capacity should arise” (Ibid., 155). When the 
putative value sufficiently exceeds the actual, managers “may find their advantage in selling out, 
or even in selling short…” (Ibid.). To effect this differential, managers “will be able to induce a 
discrepancy…by expedients well known and approved for the purpose. Partial information, as 
well as misinformation, sagaciously given out at a critical juncture, will go far toward producing 
a favorable temporary discrepancy of this kind…with advantage to themselves” (Ibid., 156-7). 
“The consequence is that a given block of capital…may, and in practice it commonly will, 
change owners much more frequently than a given industrial plant was wont to change owners 
under the old régime…” (Ibid., 156). 
Basically, the whole point is to gain some strategic advantage, an advantage that results 
in monetary gain. To this end the business enterprise makes strategic decisions and takes actions 
such as the extensive use of “loan credit,” the capitalization of earning-capacity and of good-will, 
and the control of market. Hence, “the interest of the managers of a modern corporation need not 
coincide with the permanent interest of the corporation as a going concern; neither does it 
coincide with the interest which the community at large has in the efficient management of the 
concern as an industrial enterprise” (Ibid., 157). In a nutshell, in the beginning of the 20th 
9 
 
century, Veblen not only saw the new capitalist order coming, but also warned that this new 
order controlled by captains and absentee owners was inimical to the welfare of the community.  
 
3. On the Going Concern 
 
At the center of the transformation in the capitalist order, from Veblen’s viewpoint, is the going 
concern, which is embedded in the social provisioning process. That is to say, the going concern 
concept is based on the view that economy is the instituted, continuing, and evolving process of 
social provisioning. Constituting agents or organizations of an economy—households, business 
enterprises, and the state—undertake an array of activities that are to be managed in order to 
enjoy a durable life over historical time. In particular, the private business enterprise, whether 
big or small, is established with a view to survival and reproduction, which is rendered possible 
by continuous flows of profits. To this end such activities as production, employment, costing, 
accounting, pricing, investment, and financing are organized and managed strategically. Strategic 
actions are a necessary, if not sufficient, condition for being a going concern. Transmutable 
future or radical uncertainty does not allow unchanging or non-innovative business enterprises to 
survive over an extended period of time. To be a going concern it is thus required to control itself 
and others by making and enforcing working rules. To be able to control others, a going concern 
needs power granted by law or acquired historically as a result of past activities. Otherwise, the 
life of a concern is endangered (Veblen [1904] 1975; Commons [1924] 1974, 145; Polanyi 1968, 
145-8; Ramstad 2001; Lee and Jo 2010; Lee 2012, 166). 
Central to the going concern concept are institutions, evolution, continuity/durability, 
control, and power. Being a going concern, however, does not mean that it lives forever. A 
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business corporation as a going concern is de facto liquidated, if the owner(s) decides to do so at 
will, if it is sold to another concern (un)willingly, or if the court or the state authority orders it so. 
The oldest company in history that is still on-going is Nissiyama Onsen Keiunkan, a Japanese 
hotel, founded in 705. Stora Enso, a Finnish manufacturer, was incorporated in 1288 and is still 
operating. These are quite atypical examples of going concerns. Most of the Fortune 500 
companies are far less than 100 years old. The average age of multinational corporations listed in 
Fortune 500 was between 40 and 50 years at the end of the 20th century. The same measure for 
all S&P 500 companies in 2012 was 15 years, while it was 67 years in 1920s (de Geus 1997, 1; 
BBC News 2012). 
Since most companies live less than 100 years, or even less than 1 year, should we 
conclude that they are not going concerns? And has the raison d’être of the business enterprise 
changed along with changes in capitalism? Our preliminary answer is negative. Whether an 
enterprise lives only 1 year or 100 years, its business is to be conceived of as a going concern 
insofar as 1) it involves a range of enduring structures (productive, managerial, legal, etc.); 2) its 
sequential actions take place through historical time—that is, the expectation that a business will 
last for a significant period of time or for an indefinite time is required for the management and 
potential owners; and, therefore, 3) its earning capacity is valued. In a world of radical 
uncertainty, it does not necessarily mean that the expected goal—survival and expansion—will 
be achieved. But to initiate an action, any acting person or a going concern needs to form an 
expectation. As well, to operate in the market or to be part of the social provisioning process 
related agents must view that the business enterprise is acting and will be a going concern in the 
future. A going concern is thus defined in the social context. And this definition is endorsed by 
laws and accounting practices which treat the business enterprise as a going concern. As for 
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structure, John R. Commons put it, “[i]f no structure—no going concern” (Commons [1924] 
1974, 191). That is, a going concern is always structured and thereby managed in order to 
achieve a goal. The structure of production, for example, is enduring not only because 
production takes time, but also because of the enduring nature of fixed investment goods (or 
product lines) and labor. The structure of costs is enduring as well since costing and accounting 
practices qua working rules are inseparable from the production process. Therefore a set of 
structures, working rules, and productive/managerial activities constitute a going enterprise 
which is further divided into a going plant and a going business (Veblen [1904] 1975, 137; 
Sterling 1968; Lee and Jo 2010; Lee 2012, 166). Furthermore, 
 
if the business is a “going business,” then it is either bought and sold as a unit or 
the stocks and bonds are bought and sold as shares in its expected income as a 
unit. It is only a going concern that has a valuable “goodwill” or good credit, and 
hence this is a peculiarly intangible asset (Commons [1924] 1974, 160; emphasis 
in original). 
 
In summary, the going concern concept is germane to the theory of the modern business 
enterprise from the institutional-evolutionary perspective that views the economy qua the social 
provisioning process as instituted, ongoing activities through historical time. A viable economy 
requires going concerns, and vice versa. By the same token, increasing instability in the economy 
renders going concerns more vulnerable, and vice versa. Unstable capitalism is, therefore, in 
part, business enterprises’ creation (this point is elaborated later). This is precisely the case for 
the current era of capitalism. Our concern is that the business enterprise does not seem to behave 
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in a way that is consistent with the going concern concept. We also suspect that there is an 
increasing gap between the theory of a going concern developed in the early 20th century and the 
enterprise behavior in the present era of capitalism. This gap calls for updating the institutional 
theory of the going concern, rather than replacing it with another theory. In this respect, we argue 
that: 1) the distinction between what a going concern means and how it actually behaves should 
be established, and that 2) Veblen’s theory itself, among others, offers a theoretical foundation 
for the business enterprise in the ever-changing historical process of capitalism. In what follows 
we will discuss the evolution of capitalism and of the going concern from the Veblen-cum-
Minsky perspective.  
 
4. The Evolution of Capitalism and the Business Enterprise: A Veblenian-Minskyan 
Analysis 
 
4.1. From industrial capitalism to money manger capitalism 
We have argued that a viable economy requires going concerns. This argument is now open to 
question, as was questioned and analyzed by salient heterodox economists in the past and 
present. Thorstein Veblen and Hyman Minsky, among others, are of particular interest for the 
sake of our discussion on the reciprocal relationship between capitalism and the business 
enterprise. 
As is well known, Veblen developed his arguments within an “evolutionary” context. 
Clearly, his approach went far beyond capitalism. Beginning the story in the earliest periods of 
human society, he takes us through the dawn of civilization, through feudalism and then 
capitalism. As noted earlier, the last stage of capitalism investigated was that of the “credit 
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economy” when financial arrangements began dominating industrial pursuits. It was here that the 
economy began endangering the very social provisioning process that any economy is supposed 
to (or claims to) support.  
Minsky also adopted an evolutionary perspective, though as his concern was with the 
development of capitalism only his approach is much more limited than that of Veblen. Of 
importance for this paper is his segmenting of the capitalist economy by its various stages of 
industrial and financial arrangements and control of these arrangements. “Capitalism is an 
evolving and dynamic system that has come in many forms and even now different forms 
coexist” (Minsky 1993, 362). “Commercial capitalism” gives way to “industrial capitalism” and 
“wild cat financing” gives way to “financial capitalism” which gives way to “paternalistic, 
managerial, and welfare state capitalism” which gives way —in the current period—to “money 
manager capitalism” (ibid.). As his stage theory indicates, management becomes separate from 
ownership, finance increasingly “rules the roost,” and industry takes a back seat to the ongoing 
search for monetary profit.  
Obviously, as Minsky was able to perceive and examine changes in post-WWII 
capitalism (specifically in the United States), he was also able to carry the examination beyond 
Veblen’s credit economy. It is with his stage of “money manager capitalism” that we are here 
concerned, specifically in the relationship of this stage to the organization and functioning of the 
business enterprise as an ongoing concern. Specifically, our questions are: What is the nature of 
the business enterprise in the mature stage of money manager capitalism? How does the 
financialization of the business enterprise affect the stability of the capitalist social provisioning 
process? Does or will a capitalist economy as a whole continue to be a going concern, while 
business enterprises tend to become profit pirates?  
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Let us position the argument. Business enterprises do not operate in isolation. Rather, 
they always function within an environment that is partly of their own making, and partly forced 
upon them by ever-changing capitalism. That is, there is something of a reciprocal (or 
interdependent) relationship between the enterprise and the larger social order. The social order 
“conditions” the behavior of the enterprise; the enterprise by its actions conditions (in part) the 
social order. An analogy to recent work in evolutionary biology assists in this understanding.  
The evolutionary process is one in which the world “is constantly in motion. Constraints 
become variables, causes become effect, and systems develop, destroying the conditions that 
gave rise to them.” Constant tensions for transformation of the world as a result of “the actions of 
opposing forces on them, and things are the way they are because of the temporary balance of 
opposing forces” (Levins and Lewontin 1985, 286-88). A dialectical relationship exists between 
the organism and the environment in which both are transformed as a consequence of this 
relationship, but neither “do not completely determine each other” (Ibid., 136). Existence is not 
random, but emerges and is transformed as a conjoining of chance and necessity. Chance in that 
at any specific juncture, several possibilities present themselves for subsequent evolutionary 
change; necessity in that there is a necessary relationship between organism and structure that 
constrains these possibilities. Hence, the organism is both subject and object. Organisms must 
interact with their environment as it is the environment that sustains them. In doing so, they 
change that very environment—though “not as they would like.” Indeed, this interaction in the 
life history of the organism may well spell its demise, as evolutionary history has demonstrated. 
As the process continues, “traits” are selected for evolutionary success. Thus, “[a]n organism is 
the result of complex interactions between its genes and environment, as well as its own 
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structure, where the organism takes part in the creation of its environment, its ecological niche, 
and its own construction” (Foster, Clark, and York 2008, 179).  
Any examination of the social world requires modification of the above understanding 
drawn from natural history. Nature has no purpose, but humans are purposeful (Veblen 1898, 
188). At the same time, the analogy holds in general. The business enterprise is something of a 
creature of its environment. It cannot exist until the socio-economic circumstances permit its 
existence. Then, in making adjustments to advantage itself (or at least seemingly so), it acts to 
change those circumstances. The changed circumstance then force further modification and so 
on. The Veblenian business enterprise bears no relation to the neoclassical firm which operates 
merely as a set of production functions in an environmental vacuum. Rather, there is an 
interdependent, reciprocal relationship between the enterprise and the environment.  
In Veblen’s argument, technological developments that were the response of the business 
enterprise in the handicraft stage to the competitive necessity to reduce costs of production and 
to stay one step ahead of their rivals led to oligopolistic structures—which destroyed 
competition. So the corporate form of the business enterprise started growing in number and in 
size around the mid-1800s along with the emergence of the (modern) rentier class. This new 
form was promising for the entire capitalist class to the extent that it offered greater profit 
opportunities with limited liability as well as with limited competition in the market. So the new 
order began.1 In the course of development during the age of industrial capitalism (circa mid-
1800s and early 1900s), the vested interests of the ruling class were served through the growth of 
                                                
1 The model for the “new order” of business organization was the railroad corporation, in particular, that of the 
Pennsylvania Railroad. Founded in 1846, the PRR was, in its early history, the largest railroad in the U.S. and the 
largest publicly traded corporation in the world. Over its lifespan, the PRR merged with or had a financial interest in 
800 other rail companies. It might be noted that the “Pennsy” no longer exists. (See Alexander 1967 for details. For 
the organization of U.S. railroads in general, see Chandler 1965). 
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the business corporation which was characterized by the separation of ownership from 
management. The corporation was thus the vehicle to promote the interests of the ruling class of 
the time. Underlying the success of business corporations was the fiction that private 
corporations’ profit-oriented behaviors were beneficial to the entire society (Ireland 2010; Henry 
2009). The expansion of the corporation and of the stock market that supported this institution 
was accompanied by the segmentation of the capitalist class into its main components— 
financial capitalists and industrial capitalists. (It is clear that this segmentation is not tidy; there is 
clearly overlap between some financial and some industrial capitalists, as noted below.) The 
balance of power between capitalist class segments and between social classes was temporary. 
Tensions between classes and between class segments impinged on subsequent historical 
changes in the system. 
Accelerated but unequal capitalist accumulation, on the one hand, and the pursuit of 
survival and growth or of financial gains on the other hand, led to changes in the structure of 
industry and finance. With the transformation of the economy, finance became much more 
important, and with the emergence of the “credit economy,” finance dominated industry. Those 
who control enterprises are constantly making “strategic decisions” in seeking advantage and 
these decisions reverberate in the larger social environment, causing that environment to be 
further altered. In particular, the first merger wave (1897-1904) was mainly driven by industrial 
capitalists (owner-entrepreneurs like Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller, and J.P. 
Morgan) who were keen to gain control over existing competition by way of horizontal mergers 
and acquisitions. As a result of the first wave, major industries—e.g., metals, food products, 
petroleum, railroads, chemicals, transportation equipment, fabricated metal products, machinery 
and bituminous coal—became concentrated. J.P. Morgan, as a captain of industry, for example, 
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established General Electric by consolidating Edison General Electric Company and Thomson-
Houston Electric Company in 1892. J.P. Morgan also organized the U.S. Steel Corporation by 
merging with Carnegie Steel in 1901. As a result of over a thousand mergers in the U.S., 
speculative activities in Wall Street grew markedly and resulted in the Panic of 1907, which put 
the first merger wave to an end. J.P. Morgan, as a captain of finance, also played a key role in 
stabilizing the financial market after the Panic of 1907 through an informal syndicate of Wall 
Street bankers (Blair 1972, 262; Ganley 2011, 51; McCarthy 2013, 13). 
The first merger movement was both “industrial” and “financial” in terms of its cause and 
effect, with the latter being of increasing importance. The control of industry by means of 
horizontal mergers and acquisitions not only was conducive to greater profitability, survival, and 
expansion of business enterprises, but also facilitated the development of a prosperous Wall 
Street. Meanwhile there arose new forms of tension between industry and finance, between 
engineers and businessmen, between the business enterprise and the community, all of which 
was delineated at length in Veblen’s Theory of Business Enterprise. 
As a consequence of the preceding structural changes in capitalism, later merger waves 
and regimes of capitalism were driven by and, hence, in favor of financial capitalists and 
professional managers. The financialization of the going concern was inescapable. It in turn 
followed that the lifespan of going concerns became shorter, the growth/profit rate of 
manufacturing corporations slowed down, while that of financial corporations escalated, the 
value of corporate “good-will” increased, the wealth of absentee owners and professional 
managers rose exponentially, the welfare of the underlying population was increasingly 
endangered, and the provisioning process became highly unstable (Van Lear 2001; Stockhammer 
2004; Serfati 2008; Orahangazi 2009; Dallery 2009; Wray 2009; Lazonick 2012). 
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We are now in the stage of Minsky’s money manager capitalism. (Indeed, we are 
arguably in the process of moving beyond this stage into “shareholder capitalism.”) And money 
manager capitalism has been the consequence of modifications in business enterprise behavior in 
the post-WWII period, in turn, “forcing” enterprises to seek new and different strategies in order 
to maintain themselves as going concerns. In actuality, such strategies call into question the very 
nature of a going concern.  
Minsky (1996, 363) enumerates the essential characteristics of money manager 
capitalism: 
1. Almost all business is organized through corporations. 
2. Dominant proportions of the liabilities of corporations are held either by financial 
institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, or by mutual and pension funds. 
3. This involves the intrusion of the new layer of intermediation, by pension and mutual 
funds, into the financial structure. 
4. Pension and mutual funds are bound only by contract as to what assets they can own and 
what activities they can engage in. 
5. The stated aim of fund managers is to maximize the value of the investments of the 
holders of its liabilities. 
6. The performance of a fund and of fund managers is measured by the total return on assets, 
which is given by the combination of dividends and interest received and the appreciation 
in per share value. 
In our view, the following should be added to Minsky’s list: 
7. Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) appear more frequently under the regime of money 
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manager capitalism (see Figure 1). 
8. M&A are mainly driven by speculative motives coupled with financial innovation, 
deregulation, and globalization (McCarthy 2013). 
9. To gain greater financial gains out of M&A, the value of going concerns is manipulated. 
That is, the value of “intangible assets” (including corporate goodwill)—the difference 
between the stock market value and the real asset value of a corporation—increases.2  
10. With the shortened lifespan and heightened instability of going concerns and the 
economy as a whole, business enterprises downsize, outsource, and re-engineer (or 
rationalize) themselves at a much more heightened level of activity (Whalen 2002, 403). 
Figure 1: The Evolution of Capitalism and Merger Waves since 1850 
 
Note: Authors’ illustration based on Minsky (1993), McCarthy (2013), and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 
reports. 
 
                                                
2 It is estimated that in the U.S., intangible assets now constitute 43% of the S&P 500 book value; in France, 77% 
(Serfati 2008, 47-8). 
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Return for a moment to Veblen’s period. The Theory of Business Enterprise was written 
toward the end of the great merger movement of the last part of the 19th century and first part of 
the 20th. Did these mergers make economic sense with regard to the social provisioning process? 
Yes, at least in part—as Veblen recognized. By “rationalizing” industrial concerns, the U.S. Steel 
Corporation, for example, reduced business expenses, allowed more efficient production, and 
established an organizational foundation from which the provisioning process could be made 
secure. One could also refer to the German case, where rationalization was viewed as a positive 
good in that monopoly was seen as the logical outcome of competition (and wasteful competition 
at that), leading the government to actually promote “rational” monopoly (see, Clapham 1963, 
303-314). However, at the same time, this “strategic decision” to organize the corporation also 
allowed greater control over output and pricing, and this jeopardized that provisioning process. 
The business enterprise has always been in pursuit of profit. In the handicraft stage there was 
something of a symbiotic relationship between profit and the provisioning process. The pursuit 
of profit generally meant producing more use values, the essence of this process. Under 
oligopolistic arrangements, “sabotage” of production is the more likely outcome of the profit-
generating process.   
 In the current period, “rational” mergers and acquisitions are not the dominant variety of 
this form of industrial organization. Rather, many—probably most—of these “strategic 
decisions” are designed to generate short-term profits and cater to purely financial interest. That 
is to say, under money manager capitalism the conventional meaning of a going enterprise is to 
be reconsidered due to the dominance of “finance” over “industry” (à la Veblen), “business” 
over “plant” (à la Commons), or financial capitalists over industrial capitalists. The separation of 
ownership from management, which characterized previous stages of capitalism, becomes less 
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important since both owners and managers are concerned about financial gains above anything 
else. To this end, the value of intangible assets, “putative earning capacity,” “good-will”, or 
“fictitious capital” (à la Marx and Hilferding), instead of productive earning capacity, becomes 
more important and, at the same time, needs to be manipulated. This is evidenced by stock 
options ranging from 49% (2010) to 87% (2000) of total management compensation of the top 
100 US companies (Lazonick 2012, 15), and increasing stock buybacks which has been greater 
than dividend payouts since 1997 (Lazonick 2012, 18). In the first quarter of 2011, for example, 
Exxon Mobil spent $5,653 million to repurchase its own stocks and S&P 500 companies spent 
$89.84 billion for stock buybacks, an amount equal to 45.99% of their total earnings (PR 
Newswire 2011). It should also be noted that stock price manipulation has been assisted by 
rulings of the Securities and Exchange Commission. With the adoption of Rule 10b-18 in 1982, 
the SEC permitted repurchases of a company’s stock if those repurchases did not exceed 25% of 
the stock’s average daily trading volume in the previous month and if such trading did not occur 
at the beginning or end of the trading day (Lazonick 2012, 17). Thus, business enterprises can 
spend hundreds of millions in buybacks on a daily basis, seemingly “forever”—as long as they 
limit their manipulation of prices based on the 25% maximum rule.  
 Indeed, stock price manipulation assisted by the extensive use of “loan credits” was a 
common practice in the 19th century as was explicated by Veblen ([1904] 1975). The same end is 
now achieved by a new strategy; the going concern makes extensive use of both internal and 
external funds to finance stock buybacks. This new strategy not only reflects the “new order” of 
capitalism, but also has profound effects on the entire social provisioning process (this will be 
discussed in Section 4.3).  
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4.2. Putting financialization into the social network3 
It may be useful to think of the social provisioning process as a network of embedded agency. 
Each element or unit (“nodes”) of this network, for example, represents a business enterprise that 
is interconnected with all other (or many) units. The linkages are based on financial 
relationships, connecting financial institutions and producing units. Some of these connections 
are strong, some are weak, but they are nonetheless interrelated. Moreover, some of these nodes 
are large, some are small: essentially, there is range of modal sizes running the gamut of 
possibilities. The main issue to be addressed is the “centrality” of these nodes. That is, how 
influential are these nodes—or enterprises—in determining the behavior and financial fortunes 
of the network as a whole. Clearly, enterprises such as Exxon-Mobil, J. P. Morgan—including 
all their interconnections with other enterprises—would be examples of central nodes. Such 
operations represent units with greater direct and indirect connections with other nodes through 
interlocking boards of directors, subsidiaries, etc. In such an analysis, then, the size of the node is 
only partly determined by the size of the enterprise represented: these must be weighted by 
estimates of their centrality in the system as a whole.4 This means greater influence, thus power 
over the entire network. A local grocery store has, at best, local connections and cannot influence 
the activities of the auto production enterprise, but the auto producer certainly can influence the 
activities of the grocery store, however remotely, through its level of production, thus 
employment, thus the generation of incomes. The relative success of this local social 
provisioning process depends upon how well these interconnections function in generating the 
food, clothing, shelter, etc. that constitutes the population’s livelihood. And note that this 
framework clearly articulates the provisioning process as a social process given that the relative 
                                                
3 We are greatly indebted to Mitchell Green for his interesting comments on the social provisioning process from 
the network perspective. 
4 On the social network analysis, see Wasserman and Faust (1994).  
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degree of success of the entire process depends not on any specific node, but the 
interrelationships of the system as a whole. That is, the success or failure of any particular 
business enterprise—whether a financial or production organization—is not dependent on its 
own activities, but rather, on the interrelated mechanisms among the (mainly) central nodes.5  
 This, however, raises some complicating features in this form of analysis. It is 
conceivable that a particular node may emerge as large as measured by its sales to and purchases 
from other nodes. Yet, those exchanges are of low value. The elimination of the enterprise(s) that 
constitute(s) this node, then, may not jeopardize the network as a whole, though the size of the 
node may cause one to think this would be the case. 
 On the other hand, enterprises constituting a small node may actually represent a very 
important central unit within the system as a whole. Given its financial relationships with other 
nodes, the collapse of this seemingly unimportant enterprise may well cause the network to break 
down. While this is speculative, it would appear that this issue is particularly problematic with 
regard to the financial system where we observe interconnected balance sheets in which the 
relative success of one institution is dependent on all other institutions. Thus, the collapse of  
Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, a financial enterprise relatively small by Wall Street 
standards but which had important relationships with larger units (including producing units), 
was feared to precipitate a collapse of the financial network as a whole. This necessitated a bail-
out by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
 The last complication we address is the issue of ownership or control. In the final 
analysis, all business enterprises are controlled by people. We may speak casually of “the 
corporation” and “its” actions, but any action is dictated by those who exercise actual control. 
                                                
5 It should also be noted that individual optimization or methodological individualism in general makes no sense 
from the network or the social provisioning process perspective.  
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And such control may both be difficult to specify, and may be impossible to “map” in the context 
of a network. As one illustration of this problem, we note the issue of the Samsung Group. This 
organization, consisting of 76 affiliated companies as of April 2013, would clearly constitute a 
large node in the network map. In the Korean environment, it is structured in the form of the 
“Chaebol,” large, multinational, family-controlled conglomerates, where the families have very 
strong and close relationships with government—including membership in the National 
Assembly. Yet, the power behind Samsung, that is, the decision-making entity, would be 
difficult to specify in a network that just examines the relationships among organizations: The 
Lee family, the family which controls Samsung, owns only 1.27% of the stock in the 
organization (Korea Fair Trade Commission, 2013). While this issue is not problematic from a 
production standpoint—we could identify all of Samsung’s relations with suppliers and 
purchases of its products—it may well be so from a financial standpoint. As it is obvious that 
stock ownership itself conceals the power or centrality of the Lee family with reference to its 
own organization, a question is then raised as to the financial relationships, power, control of this 
family beyond that organization.6  
In line with the evolutionary (or dialectical) approach to the notion of the going concern, 
these nodes and their interconnections are not static, but ever-changing. Some grow, some 
shrink; some die, some are born. Clearly, changes in the technological makeup of the economy 
have a bearing on this (there was no node representing Microsoft 50 years ago, and Microsoft 
and its various connections has changed from a very small node to one that’s now quite large), as 
do mergers and acquisitions (nodes can converge to form larger nodes, representing greater 
                                                
6 In a recent article, Hayden, Garner, and Hoffman (2013), a network analysis of the Koch Industries and TD 
Ameritrade Holding Corporation demonstrates the extensive connections of these two nodes, showing not only 
relationships with various economic units, but also political bodies. Essentially, through such an analysis the 
economic, social and political influence of individuals—in this case the Koch brothers in particular—can be 
underscored. 
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influence or power). Moreover, going enterprises within the network organize trade associations 
and cartels aiming immediately at avoiding “excessive competition” and ultimately at 
reproducing themselves (Veblen [1904] 1975, 32, fn. 1). The network or the provisioning 
process is thus not only established but also controlled by going concerns therein contained. One 
should also consider the influence of non-directly economic organizations such as the IMF, 
World Bank, Business Roundtable, and of course “the state” in “directing traffic” in a sense. 
That is, such organizations are very influential in determining in part the movements and 
outcomes of the ongoing dialectical process. In particular, the activities of such organizations in 
facilitating the weakening of labor organizations in the interests of wage reduction (or 
stagnation), the gutting of pension programs, etc. in order to promote monetary gain for the 
business enterprise should be examined and evaluated in the context of the network.7 
Now, what one would want to know when mapping such a network is the degree to 
which large financial enterprises—Allianz, Bank of America, etc.—exercise control over 
production enterprises (as well as other financial enterprises), and the extent that relationships 
with the organizations above facilitate this control. That is, what are the respective sizes and 
centrality of the nodes of certain financial organizations and how strong are the linkages to both 
other financial nodes as well as those nodes representing production organizations and to the 
IMF, the state, etc.? Such a map would be developed on the basis of information based on 
interlocking directorships, stock ownership of specific types, subsidiaries and so on. If one had 
sufficient data (and sufficient time, technical acumen, etc.), it would be possible to “map” all the 
interrelationships and, thus, better understand the mechanisms and processes through which 
                                                
7 Indeed, it is quite probable that organizations such as the Trilateral Commission, Business Roundtable, etc. are 
created to manipulate and control such a network at both the national and international level. See, for example, 
Carroll and Sapinski (2010) for a network analysis of these organizations and the major individuals who figure 
prominently in the development and operation of these structures.  
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social provisioning is delivered. We would then be better able to understand the social 
provisioning process, specify weaknesses or problems in the provisioning process and to 
pinpoint those nodes where such problems originate and, hypothetically at least, provide 
remedies to those problems.  
The current authors have neither the expertise nor the time to develop such a map. We do 
understand the economy (and larger society) as an organic whole in which there is a reciprocal 
relationship between the specific units and the social environment (as discussed in Section 4.1) 
and is undergoing constant change. For the purposes here, we refer the reader to one such 
network analysis in which the authors estimate that currently the 40 largest financial 
conglomerates control, in a complex network of overlapping ownership, membership in boards 
of directors, etc., the 43,000 largest transnational corporations (Vitali, et al., 2011, 4).  
What does this mean for the social provisioning process? From the standpoint of financial 
interests, and this increasingly is the only concern of the modern business enterprise, many, 
perhaps most, business enterprises are irrelevant—they do not generate large enough financial 
flows to matter from the vantage point of the large, financial enterprises; their capitalized value 
is small. The network can survive and function well even though many of the enterprises that are 
integral to the provisioning process are jettisoned. Whether a “going concern” indeed goes on 
depends on its ability to serve the requirements of the large financial enterprises. Hence, the 
financial network can thrive even though its very success jeopardizes the well-being of the 
general population—and this is precisely what we have been witnessing at the global level. Thus, 
from the vantage point of the provisioning process, or serviceability to humankind in terms of the 
production of goods and services, it would be far better to create a network that does not depend 
on the monetary objectives of a relatively small number of large, central nodes. Financial 
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misfortunes of one or a few of such nodes could cause the entire system to collapse. From the 
authors’ perspective, it would be even better to develop a social provisioning process that does 
not depend on monetary incentives at all, but that takes us far beyond the scope of this argument. 
 
4.3. Effects of financialization on the social provisioning process 
Financialization has intensified itself through the financial control of going concerns. While 
different authorities differ as to the precise amount or degree of control of industrial (and 
financial) enterprises due to the nature of the data and problems in interpreting that data, there 
certainly is widespread acknowledgment that Marx’s prediction of growing concentration and 
centralization has occurred and is intensifying in the present period, and that control is 
increasingly exercised by financial organizations.   
Building on the work of Alfred Chandler and his own contributions (among others), 
William Lazonick has recently argued that the Chandlerian, innovating corporation “has ceased 
to exist.” In the current period, the ““New Economy business model” (NEBM) … [has] relegated 
the “Old Economy” Chandlerian corporation to history” (Lazonick 2010, 344). Stock buybacks 
in the interests of driving up stock prices—a practice that began in the 1980’s—has diverted 
internal funds from research and development to purely speculative activities of a “strategic” 
nature to promote “shareholder value” (and accompanying exorbitant executive salaries). One 
significant consequence of this development is that the ability of the older corporate form to 
promote “sustainable prosperity” (Ibid., 330) has weakened (if not disintegrated). Sustainable 
prosperity, of course, speaks to the social provisioning process and this requires that the 
“ongoing concern” of note must direct its operations, at least in large measure, toward physical 
production, not monetary reproduction and expansion.  
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An aspect of the social provisioning process that tends to get delinked from the 
production of material output is its relationship to employment. Production requires people to 
produce. And employment generates income with which those producers sustain themselves. 
Beginning in the 1980’s, capitalism has entered a period of “jobless growth” and this has several 
causes. To be sure, as technology changes there will always be some effect on employment in 
those sectors incorporating new technology. One can also point to globalization and the 
accompanying outsourcing that certainly has employment consequences (at least in terms of 
providing “internal” jobs). Such developments can be seen as “rational” in the sense that they 
can increase productive efficiency.  But, often overlooked is the relation of unemployment to the 
manipulation of stock prices to “maximize shareholder value.”  
 
[O]nce changes in the structure of employment have become widespread for 
productive reasons, corporations have been known to terminate employees in 
order to increase short-term profits for the sake of inciting speculative increases in 
their companies’ stock prices…. [U]nder a regime of financialized corporate 
resource allocation, the tendency has then been to allocate those extra profits to 
stock buybacks for the purpose of giving a company’s stock price a manipulative 
boost. (Lazonick 2012, 10) 
 
Indeed, financialization manifests itself in different forms. Notably, as Figure 2 shows, 
over the period from 1980 to 2011, full-time employment has declined by 8,357,000 in the 
manufacturing sector and increased by 2,384,000 in the FIRE (Financial, Insurance, Real Estate, 
Rental, and Leasing) sector. It should also be noticed that for the same period value added 
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generated by the manufacturing sector as a percent of GDP has declined from 20% to 11.5%, 
while the same measure has increased from 16% to 20.3% in the FIRE sector. Not only is the 
FIRE sector now the largest sector in the US economy in terms of value added, but also the 
manufacturing sector becomes more dependent upon the FIRE sector, as evidenced by increasing 
nonfinancial corporation interest payments as a percentage of total cash flow—on average 
27.49% between 1948 and 1979, 53.89% since 1980 (NIPA Table 1.16, U.S. Bureau of 
Economics Analysis). 
 
Figure 2. Full-Time Employment and Value Added by Manufacturing and FIRE Sectors 
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 The dark side of the jobless growth of the economy is the stagnant wage share and the 
disappearance of “secure” jobs. “Growth” then means growth in wealth of the top 1%, absentee 
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owners, whose major income is capital gains (see Lazonick 2012, 12-13). Also note that the top 
1% income is extremely volatile as it is largely dependent on the stock market. Even more so is 
the welfare of the remaining population as it is dependent upon the markets created and 
controlled by the ruling class. That is, “workers’ future lifestyles depends on the profitability of 
corporate America” (Soederberg 2010, 44) and “the returns to the savings of American 
households are directly dependent on the sustainability of high yields on corporate stock. What 
will happen to US consumption, and to the US (and world) economy, if the US stock market 
should turn down, and stay down?” (Lazonick and O’Sullivan 2000, 32). 
Indicative of all the effects of financialization highlighted so far is that the business 
enterprises are vehicles to promote the vested interests of the ruling class. But not in a 
conventional sense. It is now more like a means to “take the money.” As a result, while existing 
going concerns die, the capitalist class as a whole survives and grows (in value terms), insofar as 
new concerns, new markets, and new demands are created. At the same time, the increasing 
instability in or weakened viability of the social provisioning process does not guarantee that the 
capitalist class lives forever. This is a “neoliberal paradox” (Crotty 2003, 272) in the sense that 
the pursuit of ever-increasing monetary gains by financializing productive units destroys the very 
foundation of the capitalist provisioning process. Such an internal contradiction of money 
manager capitalism is driven by the “double nature” of the business going concerns (Serfati 
2008, 38).  
Also indicative of financialization is that it is necessary to explain prevailing 
institutions—that is, the mode of the social provisioning—if one wishes to understand the nature 
and behavior of the business enterprise in the present era. The interest of owners and managers 
are not predetermined, but determined by surrounding institutions (Stockhammer 2004). For 
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example, the major owners of stock in the permanent enterprise would be the real dominating 
and determining force, while in the temporary enterprise managers might just have discretion.  
Last, we observe that in the age of money manager capitalism, the interest of absentee 
owners is fictitiously equated to that of the nation. This is precisely the case Veblen was 
anticipating in Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in Recent Times: 
 
[B]y a curious twist of patriotic emotion the loyal citizens are enabled to believe 
that these extra-territorial gains of the country’s business men will somehow 
benefit the community at large… the illusions of national solidarity enable the 
loyal ones to believe that the gains which so come to these absentee owners at the 
cost of the taxpayers will benefit the taxpayers in some occult way which no loyal 
citizen should inquire into too closely. (Veblen [1923] 1964, 36) 
 
The famous Charles Wilson quote, “what [is] good for the country [is] good for General Motors 
and vice versa,” has now been writ large and accepted as the conventional view. 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Is Veblen’s concept of the “ongoing concern” still viable? Provisionally, we conclude that it is. 
However, with ongoing changes in the capitalist social order, specifically in reference to 
Minsky’s stage of money manager capitalism, we also argue that it is in need of modification. 
And this should not surprise. Any theoretical proposition stands in need of modification (or 
elimination) as that which it analyzes undergoes internal adaptation in response to changes in the 
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social order within which it exists and, in turn, affects that social order as it adapts. The business 
enterprise is no exception. 
 Our main concern, however, is not with the business enterprise itself, but with the social 
provisioning process. Is it conceivable that the recent “evolutionary” process of modern 
capitalism has so distanced the business enterprise from its supposed task of satisfying the 
requirements of the provisioning process that the latter is itself endangered? If so, what does this 
mean for the future of capitalism? Is a reform of the capitalist order possible? If not, will 
capitalism’s self-destructive characteristics—noted by Marx, by Veblen, by Keynes—spell an 
end to this phase of human existence? If so, then what? 
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